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Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines earned D.F.M. Strauss the Herman Dooyeweerd prize 
awarded at the Christian Philosophy Conference 2011, Amsterdam. Everyone who has worked 
his way through its 650 pages cannot but be overwhelmed by the richness of materials brought 
together and systematised. It is a landmark both in his personal bibliography that started almost 
40 years ago with his doctoral study Begrip en Idee (1973) and in the history of Reformational 
philosophy.1
The preface concludes with a gracious acknowledgment of teachers and fellow students who 
have helped him to ‘digest and further develop the legacy of reformational philosophy’. One sees 
that the book does not present itself as an entirely new interpretation making short shrift with 
all earlier interpretations but as a stage in a communal trajectory. This is sympathetic, although, 
of course, we still have to find out whether the community of thought invoked functions only in 
determining what has been bequeathed or also in ‘digesting’ and ‘developing’ this legacy.
The title offers a further clue as to the genre of the book. The reference to disciplines indicates 
that philosophy is situated in the vicinity of the special sciences. Apparently, this study aims to 
show philosophy’s relevance for the sciences, and not, for instance, for the pursuit of meaning 
or the development of a worldview or lifeview. But the formulation ‘discipline of the disciplines’ 
makes clear that its role should be understood as foundational, rather than as a clearing up of 
what those sciences have left unresolved. Finally, by speaking of a discipline amongst disciplines 
it stresses that philosophy does not hold this foundational position as readymade and waiting 
to be applied, but rather that its systematics can only be developed in close conjunction with the 
special sciences.2 It is an idea of philosophy very much present in Herman Dooyeweerd (more so 
than in Vollenhoven’s work) and that since then has been worked out in various ways by many 
of the philosophers mentioned in the preface of this book, but only reaching encyclopedic breadth 
in the work of Dick Stafleu and, indeed, Danie Strauss. 
Turning now to the table of contents we immediately discern two salient features. Firstly, just 
by consulting the titles one notices that all chapters relate in one way or another to the theory 
of ‘modal structures’. Secondly, the quantitative, spatial and kinematic aspects appear to play a 
pivotal role within the order of modalities.
Unmistakably, the theory of modal structures holds pride of place in this conception. Strauss 
follows Dooyeweerd in interpreting creational diversity and coherence first and foremost as 
diversity and coherence of modal structures. Moreover, with Strauss, the modal structures also 
form the horizon against which issues of unity, universality, uniqueness, infinity, et cetera, are 
being placed. On this score he differs from Dooyeweerd. I will restrict myself for the moment 
to unity. In this respect Dooyeweerd follows a scheme that is essentially Kantian. Put simply, it 
means that unity comes about by the synthesis of a given diversity – a synthesis transcending 
the level at which the diversity occurred. On this account unity always lies beyond diversity – 
there is no unity-in-diversity! In Dooyeweerd’s case this gives rise to the (in-)famous quest for 
an Archimedean point. The leading question is: where to find a place from which the whole can 
be overseen? The answer is: in the human heart; only here is life still one (as Kuyper was fond of 
saying). In Strauss’s view, however, unity is already given a level of diversity. Thus, there is no 
use for an Archimedean point nor for a concentration point in the human heart. All synthesis is 
inter-modal (pp. 363–307; pace Kant).
Characteristic for Strauss’s conception is the assumption that notions such as unity, uniqueness, 
universality, continuity, discreteness, permanence, change, part and whole have their home in the 
basic domains of the modal order and can at those levels be shown to be mutually compatible. The 
1.See Alan Cameron’s glowing review in Philosophia Reformata 77, 85–90.
2.The title of the final chapter does refer to what lies beyond the disciplines: ‘Philosophy is more than the “Discipline of the Disciplines”’. 
But this overture serves to account for the influence of ultimate commitments on what lies on this side of the borderline, not to 
cross the border. See the title of its final section: ‘The presence of ultimate commitments within the special sciences’. On ultimate 
commitments see also p. 462 and section 5.14: ‘Trust (faith) in rationality’ (187–188).
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author takes pains to show that many (all?) of the antinomies 
and paradoxes that have marred Western philosophy 
originate in disregard for the creation order, and especially 
of those basic domains. Don’t think this only regards worn-
out, Zeno-type paradoxes about how to conceive motion. It is 
the author’s conviction that such a vital ‘–ism’ as historicism 
is equally flawed by misconceiving the basic relationship 
between constancy and change (p. 292).
Back to the foundations
The point is not, of course, that any use of notions beyond their 
basic sphere ipso facto turns them into contraband. However, 
one does get such an impression by Strauss’s rather cavalier 
dismissal of what he sees as a lack of critical thinking. So, 
for instance, versus Giddens he says: ‘In different contexts 
he simply uses the terms (social) differentiation and integration 
without realizing that they reflect biotic analogies within the 
structure of the social aspect’ (p. 528). Does this not sound 
like a Derridean deconstruction programme? It is only by 
re-reading the statement carefully that one understands 
the point: it is not that Giddens wrongly used the term 
differentiation, for it does denote a very real element of the 
structure of the social aspect. What is criticised is a wanting 
reflection on the analogous character of this element. See also 
this comment on mathematical logic: ‘This discipline simply 
introduces the terms constants and variables intuitively, 
without even addressing the question about analogical 
concepts’ (p. 234). Another example would be on page 390 
where a certain Regan is taken to task for positing criteria for 
moral principles such as consistency and adequacy of scope:
He does not realize that these terms stem from diverse irreducible 
modal domains – consistency resides in the logical aspect (non-
contradiction); adequacy of scope is equivalent to (…) universality 
which reflects the spatial meaning of everywhere …. . 
In spite of appearances to the contrary, the point is not 
that the use of ‘consistency’, et cetera, in moral theory is 
to be condemned; it is perfectly legitimate lest a proper 
(philosophical) account be given of its origin. One final 
example is the objection against Calvin Seerveld’s use 
of ‘nuancefulness’ to characterise the aesthetic. Notice 
the ‘nothing but’ in the following statement: ‘the term 
nuancefulness without any doubt analogically reflects 
nothing but precisely the meaning of the numerical and the 
spatial aspects of reality …’ (p. 253). It would, of course, be 
absurd to hold that the use of ‘nuancefulness’ in aesthetics is 
illegitimate. The proper interpretation must be that what is 
rejected is its claim to denote the meaning-nucleus.
Why do I list all these examples? In the first place it is to 
illustrate the great weight given to the modal order. Secondly, 
to illustrate the main line followed in Strauss’s critique of 
other authors crossing his path. Last but not least, it is to 
show a certain likeness to a deconstruction programme. Let 
me make this last point more clear. The author’s strategy 
is to show the relevance of philosophy by problematising 
concepts forming the stock-in-trade of practitioners of the 
special disciplines. I am not convinced by this approach. 
Should we as philosophers not start with acknowledging 
social (societal) differentiation, moral consistency, aesthetic 
nuance(-fulness), et cetera, as genuine, full-fledged notions? 
This is not just a matter of choosing the most expedient 
approach for a philosophy of the special disciplines. In the 
first place it is about the significance of the foundational 
relation. To return once more to the discussion with Giddens, 
also if we agree that the relation to the biotic differentiation 
is constitutive for what social differentiation means it is still 
not clear what insights are gained this way. Would it help 
Giddens to become a better sociologist? I for one am not 
convinced. It seems more fruitful to focus instead on the place 
of this notion within the entire constellation of the economic, 
social and jural aspects.
It is not that Danie Strauss neglects the disclosure of ‘later’ 
modal structures. On the contrary, he stresses that the ‘ontic 
coherence’ is enhanced. However, even so, the emphasis 
remains on the ‘constitutive’ foundational relations rather 
than on the ‘regulative’ anticipatory relations (for instance 
pp. 227–229, 233).
 
Concept and idea
Thus far I did not mention one of the most interesting themes 
of the book: the idea of ‘concept-transcending knowledge’. 
For Strauss, properly speaking, the use of ‘concept’ is only 
valid if all the elements pertain to one and the same domain. 
A notion such as ‘social differentiation’ would not qualify as 
a concept in a strict sense because it depends for its meaning 
on elements pertaining to the biotic domain. Yet – and this 
is important – it can nevertheless serve as a vehicle for valid 
knowledge (pp. 179–182, and passim).
The theory behind the notion of concept-transcending 
knowledge was first developed in his doctoral dissertation, 
Begrip en Idee. This conception of ‘idea’ as concept-
transcending is now brought to bear on issues touching on 
the unique, contingent and individual (p. 191). It means 
that we can never claim to have conceptual knowledge 
of what makes something unique. It also means that we 
may nevertheless have valid knowledge. Thus, the author 
develops a challenging approach that tries to steer clear from 
both conceptual dogmatism and agnosticism.
One application deserves special mention. This is with regard 
to our speaking about God (pp. 195–204). The texts offer a 
philosophical justification for ‘modal terms the Bible uses’ 
in this respect (p. 195). For example, the speaking of God’s 
omnipresence, his acting, of ‘God is life’, ‘God is love’ are 
all instances of concept-transcending ideas (p. 195). As such 
they represent valid knowledge. Strauss distances himself 
in this regard from the ‘negative theology’ of Vollenhoven’s 
Isagoogè philosophiae. Vollenhoven, as is well known, held 
that we can only speak about God confessionally and never 
theoretically. Strauss’s point is that Vollenhoven is caught in 
a vicious cycle for by speaking about a boundary between 
God and creation he does use a concept-transcending idea 
of a boundary maintained by God (pp. 204−205) The same 
argument is leveled against B.J. van der Walt’s claim that we 
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cannot speak about God in spatial terms (p. 205). I expect 
this critique is provocative enough to call forth a spirited 
response from his Vollenhovian friends!
The state
The last major chapter is dedicated to human society, about 
one third of which is dedicated to the state (pp. 548−574). 
Here, Jonathan Chaplin is his main sparring partner. 
Generally, Danie Strauss succeeds in offering a balanced 
account, avoiding conservatism and progressivism. Another 
good point is the sharp delineation of typical tasks from non-
typical activities. It is very important that the administering 
of public justice be upheld as the state’s main task. My own 
experience is that the insights of Reformational philosophers 
find much appreciation with a broader public.
My disagreement here is restricted to what I perceive as a too 
narrow definition of the state’s proper tasks. The author takes 
his cue from Dooyeweerd’s definition of the nature of the state 
in terms of attaining a harmonious balance both in regard to 
legal regulations (law side) and legal interests (subject side) 
(p. 570). Such delineation implies that, for example, keeping 
up the value of the Rand or the Herculean task of saving the 
Euro would be non-typical. Obviously, monetary policies are 
as vital to the state as the tasks listed as typical. For a similar 
reason, I am also not comfortable with the designation of 
civil law as private (p. 563). It seems to me that the state’s 
involvement with the conditions and quality of civil law is 
so strong and so much in line with its responsibility for the 
legal order that the qualification ‘public’ is fully warranted 
(as Jonathan Chaplin holds).  
 
Finally
Philosophy: Discipline of the Disciplines is an immensely 
stimulating book. It does not take prophetic gifts to predict 
that it will become one of the classics of Reformational 
philosophy. Paideia Press deserves our thanks for publishing 
a book of almost 700 pages. The quality of the printing leaves 
nothing to be desired. 
